

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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COUNTRY Philippines

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SUBJECT Instructions to Elements of HMB/
Philippine Communist Regional Command
10 on Reinforcing Security

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NS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(KEY SEE REVERSE)

1. Leaders of subordinate units of HMB/Philippine Communist Regional Command (RECO) 10, which are active in Laguna and Batangas Provinces, were instructed during March - April 1953 by RECO-10 Headquarters to screen and investigate all the members of their organizations, particularly those persons who formerly were active in the Communist-dominated Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO).¹ According to the instructions, the majority of these former CLO members are, in fact, infiltrators assigned by the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to report on the activities of the HMB/Philippine Communist organization.²
2. At the present time, it is standard procedure within RECO-10, and presumably also within all other RECO organizations, to review the loyalties of all members periodically. Particular attention is now to be given in these loyalty checks to cadres who are free to move about in towns and in urban areas on assignments for the Party or HMB. Periodic loyalty checks were said to be routine procedure in the Party's underground organization.³
3. At a conference attended by representatives of the RECO-10 leadership near Nagcarlan Rizal, on 26 March 1953, the following general policies, recently enunciated by the highest HMB/Party organs, were discussed with a view to their immediate implementation:⁴

I. Infiltrators.

- a. No undesirable persons will henceforth be admitted to membership in the HMB or Party organization. These undesirables include persons guilty of the crimes of murder, robbery, or other offenses for which they are being sought by the Government; persons who have deserted their families because of petty disagreements; persons who desire to join the Communist movement purely for

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their personal benefit; surrenderees who have simulated escape from detention; and Army troops who claim to have deserted to join the Communist movement.⁵

- b. Persons of the foregoing descriptions were said to be responsible in part for the present low ebb of the revolutionary tide. In addition to spying on the movement, these persons were said to attempt to persuade other members of the movement to surrender to the Government.

II. Propaganda and the World Situation.

- a. Another reason for the ebb in the revolutionary tide has been the poor conduct of propaganda activities. It was pointed out that the Philippine press continues to give considerable attention to reports of atrocities, murders, kidnappings, robberies, and other crimes, all of which are attributed to the HMB. This press coverage of crimes generally attributed to the HMB was said to have given the Communist movement a bad name and to have served to alienate the masses. It was decided that the Communist movement would launch an intensive campaign of counter-propaganda to neutralize this trend.⁶
- b. The Three K's slogan (Peace, Freedom, and Prosperity) is to be promoted and popularized; American imperialists in the Philippines are to be exposed and denounced; the JUSMAG and MSA organizations are to be denounced as instruments of American imperialism; and efforts will be made to have the atomic bomb outlawed.

III. Local Politics.

- a. It was concluded that former Defense Secretary Ramon Magsaysay will be successful in his campaign for the presidency as the Nacionalista Party candidate. It was suggested that JUSMAG officials ordered Magsaysay to join the Nacionalista Party because this Party, rather than the Administration Liberal Party, has retained the popular confidence. In the event of a dishonest election resulting in Magsaysay's defeat, it is believed the Army will be divided into two hostile camps, with a strong likelihood of civil war as a result; in this event, the Communist movement would be in a strategic position to exploit the situation and to regenerate the revolutionary flow.
- b. Cadres of lower organs were to be instructed to participate in the bourgeois political struggle in an effort to stimulate the emotions of the masses and to intensify the hostilities already existing between the Liberal and Nacionalist Parties. However, cadres were to be instructed that they should not lose sight of the fact that both the Liberals and the Nacionalistas are merely tools of the American imperialists.⁷

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